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I. INTRODUCTION
Even before the ink was dry on President Obama’s signature
on the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, or “PPACA,”
Florida and twelve other states sued in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Florida to stop the Act. 1
Thirteen more states, several individuals, and the National
Federation of Independent Businesses later joined the suit. 2 States
brought cases in other federal courts, too, all lodging similar
challenges against the Act.
The plaintiffs’ principal argument was that PPACA’s
individual coverage provision, the so-called “individual mandate,”
exceeded Congress’s powers. The minimum coverage provision
required most individuals to maintain a minimum level of health
insurance by a certain time. 3 It was designed to help achieve the
Act’s goals of universal health insurance coverage and keeping
health-care costs in check. 4 But plaintiffs claimed that Congress
*Associate Professor, The John Marshall Law School. I would like to
thank Professor Kathryn J. Kennedy for organizing and inviting me to
participate in this symposium. I would also like to thank my fellow symposium
participants, who provided valuable feedback on the ideas and arguments
presented here. Finally, I would like to thank the staff of the JOHN MARSHALL
LAW REVIEW for its outstanding work on this piece. All errors, of course, are
my own.
1. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2580 (2012).
2. Id.
3. The Act also contained a requirement that certain employers provide
minimum coverage for their employees. 26 U.S.C. § 4980H.
4. The universal coverage requirement complemented two other insurance
regulations in the PPACA, the “guaranteed issue” provision and the
“community rating” provision. The “guaranteed issue” prohibits health
947
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lacked power to force individuals into a market (the health
insurance market), or to require them to purchase something (like
health insurance) that they did not want. 5
The plaintiffs also challenged another provision in the Act:
Medicaid expansion. 6 Medicaid expansion was designed to provide
Medicaid coverage for a greater number of individuals, in
particular, individuals who earned up to 138 percent of the federal
poverty line. 7 Like the individual coverage provision, Medicaid
expansion helped serve the Act’s goals of universal health
insurance coverage and keeping health-care costs in check. But
plaintiffs claimed that Congress lacked authority to enact the
provision.
In particular, plaintiffs argued that Congress could not
condition a state’s entire federal Medicaid budget on a state’s
adoption of the expansion. Plaintiffs argued that the sheer size of
the states’ Medicaid programs, and the generous size of the
promised federal contribution to Medicaid expansion, made
Medicaid expansion all but compulsory for the states. Therefore,
they said, Congress lacked authority to so compel the states to
act. 8
Balking states also claimed that they did not want to expand
Medicaid. They argued that Medicaid expansion would be too
costly for them, despite the very generous promised federal
contribution. They also claimed that the federal government’s
efforts to expand Medicaid would require a substantial
commitment of federal funds (which would require the federal
government to tax citizens, which would leave citizens less money
to pay state taxes, which would ultimately frustrate the states’
abilities to achieve their own policy goals, whatever those goals
may be).
The states’ arguments against the PPACA were novel. As to
the individual coverage provision, the Supreme Court had never
defined a limit on congressional authority based on a person’s
participation, or not, in a particular market. As to Medicaid
expansion, the Court had never defined a limit on congressional
authority to condition federal funding based on the size of a preinsurers from denying coverage to individuals with pre-existing conditions. 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-1. The “community rating” provision requires health insurers
to base health insurance rates on four factors (including self-only or family
enrollment plans, geographic area, tobacco use, and age), but not on health
factors. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg. Those provisions would have driven insurance
companies out of the market without the additional revenue they would collect
from newly enrolled individuals under the universal coverage requirement.
5. Brief of State Respondents on the Minimum Coverage Provision,
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (No. 11-398) at 15-24
(Feb. 6, 2012).
6. See infra notes 20 and accompanying text.
7. Id.
8. Id.
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existing program or the generosity of the federal contribution.
The states’ positions were, and are, also surprising, especially
with regard to Medicaid expansion. That is because Medicaid
expansion amounts to a remarkably generous gift from the federal
government to the states. Expansion would extend health
insurance coverage to a wide swath of Americans, and it would
cost the states very little, potentially even yielding a net savings.
Maybe most surprising: the states that stand to gain the most are
the loudest objectors. 9 These states now say that they will decline
to expand Medicaid.
Why? Objecting states argue Medicaid expansion will cost
them and their citizens too much money. But the studies belie
this. Most studies, before and after the Supreme Court ruled on
the states’ challenge in National Federation of Independent
Businesses v. Sebelius (“NFIB”), 10 concluded that Medicaid
expansion would cost the states very little and could yield
substantial cost savings. 11
So with all its benefits and few, if any, drawbacks, why do
states continue to balk at Medicaid expansion? One reason is raw
politics. From its inception, the PPACA has been a political
lightning rod, dividing Democrats (who largely support it) and
Republicans (who largely oppose it). Medicaid expansion is a
particularly explosive and politically controversial component of
the PPACA. 12 The fact that raw politics can drive opposition to
policy is hardly news. But the political opposition to Medicaid
expansion is different, because it comes at such a high cost to the
state itself. A state’s refusal to participate in Medicaid expansion
means that many of the state’s poorest citizens will go without
insurance coverage, that the state itself will decline a remarkably
generous federal gift, and that the state will forego all attendant
economic benefits. In short, opposing states forego significant
policy gains in order to score a modest political point.
Another reason is that the opposition to Medicaid expansion
is just one piece of a larger effort to dismantle the PPACA. After
opponents failed to overturn the Act in the Supreme Court and in
Congress, they now attack the Act piecemeal in the states and the
courts. For example, some states have declined to join state health
insurance exchanges. This undermines the PPACA’s attempts to
expand health insurance coverage and keep costs in check by
creating single point-of-purchase marketplaces where consumers
9. See, e.g., Obamacare Facts: Dispelling the Myths, available at
http://obamacarefacts.com/obamacares-medicaid-expansion.php (last visited
Apr. 7, 2014).
10. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2566.
11. For example, every state that opted out of Medicaid expansion has a
Republican governor. Obamacare Facts: Dispelling the Myths, supra note 9.
12. See, e.g., id. (explaining that some states with Republican governors,
however, have opted in to Medicaid expansion).
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can compare and select policies. Opponents have challenged the
PPACA’s so-called “employer mandate” in the lower courts.
Additionally, opponents have challenged particular health
insurance coverage requirements (the so-called contraception
mandate) in the lower courts and now in the Supreme Court.
These piece-by-piece challenges seek to pick off only portions of the
PPACA. But because the Act depends on near universal coverage
to succeed, these piece-by-piece challenges threaten to
significantly undermine the entire Act, or even kill it—a death by
a thousand cuts.
Opponents first sought to overturn Medicaid expansion
entirely, in NFIB. Having failed in that effort, and having failed to
overturn the PPACA in Congress, they declined to expand
Medicaid in many states. In the wake, when all is said and done,
opponents will have left substantial federal dollars on the table,
they will have left a significant number of poor people uninsured,
they will have foregone the economic policy benefits of increased
federal grants and broader health insurance coverage, and they
will have left behind bad constitutional law. This is a singularly
high price to pay for politics. It is strange politics, indeed.
This paper first outlines the Medicaid program, Medicaid
expansion in the PPACA, and the Court’s ruling on Medicaid
expansion in NFIB. It next explores the impacts of the opposition
to Medicaid expansion. In particular, it details the substantial
federal resources that opposing states will leave on the table, the
health insurance coverage that states stand to deny to their poor
citizens, and the constitutional law that opposing states left in
NFIB.

II. MEDICAID EXPANSION AND NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
INDEPENDENT BUSINESSES
Congress enacted the Medicaid program in 1965. 13 Medicaid
is a jointly-funded, federal-state, cooperative-federalism program
that provides medical care to pregnant women, children, needy
families, the blind, the elderly, and the disabled. 14 Under the
program, the federal government provides federal funds to states
on the condition that they satisfy certain federal criteria. 15 Those
criteria set the qualifications of program participants, the services
available to program participants, and the costs of those services. 16
States contribute their own funds and administer their own
Medicaid programs. 17 Despite the federal criteria, states retain
13. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a et seq.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10).
15. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2581-82 (2012) (describing the Medicaid
program).
16. See, e.g., id. (describing the Medicaid program).
17. See, e.g., id. (describing the Medicaid program).
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substantial flexibility in setting the rules for their own programs. 18
Nothing in federal law requires states to participate in
Medicaid; it is a purely voluntary program. 19 Indeed, when
Congress first enacted the Medicaid program, only twenty-six
states signed up within the first year. 20 Over time, however, the
federal funds became sufficiently attractive, and the health-care
needs in the states became sufficiently acute, that more and more
states joined the program. By 1972, forty-nine states plus the
District of Columbia signed up, and by 1982, every state had
elected to participate in Medicaid. 21 It is easy to see why. Medicaid
comprises 20 percent of the average state total budget, 22 and the
federal contribution rate generally falls between 50 percent and 83
percent of a state’s total Medicaid expenditures, generally
averaging 57 percent, depending on the state’s per capita income. 23
On average, the federal government contributes 10 percent of a
state’s total budget in Medicaid funds. 24
The basic Medicaid program is the same today as it was in
1965. But over time, Congress added certain requirements,
expanded eligibility, and expanded benefits. 25 Congress put the
states on notice when it enacted the Medicaid Act that it might
make changes like these to the Medicaid program. In particular,
Congress expressly reserved the “right to alter, amend, or repeal
any provision of the Act.” 26 Moreover, federal regulations require
each state to amend its plan “whenever necessary to reflect
. . . [c]hanges in Federal law.” 27
Thus, in 1972, Congress created Supplemental Security
Income for the Aged, Blind, and Disabled (“SSI”). 28 SSI replaced a
former federal Medicaid requirement that participating states
18. See, e.g., id. (describing the Medicaid program).
19. See, e.g., id. (describing the Medicaid program).
20. A Historical Review of How States Have Responded to the Availability
of Federal Funds for Health Coverage, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND
THE UNINSURED 2 (Aug. 2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files
.wordpress.com/2013/01/8349.pdf. Thirty-seven states signed up within two
years. Id.
21. Id. at 2.
22. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604-05.
23. State Expenditure Report 2010 (Fiscal 2009-2011), NATIONAL ASS’N OF
STATE BUDGET OFFICERS 11, Table 5 (2011) available at www.nasbo.org
/sites/default/files/2010%20State%20Expenditure%20Report_0.pdf.
24. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583.
25. See generally A Historical Review, supra note 20 (describing the
history of the Medicaid program); Medicaid: A Timeline of Key Developments,
THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundat
ion.files.wordpress.com/2008/04/5-02-13-medicaid-timeline.pdf (last visited
Apr. 18, 2014); History, CMS.GOV, available at www.cms.gov/About-CMS
/Agency-Information/History/index.html?redirect=/history/ (last visited Apr.
18, 2014).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1304.
27. 42 C.F.R. § 430.12(c)(1)(i).
28. Pub. L. No. 92-603, 86 Stat. 1465 (1972).
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provide medical assistance to individuals receiving welfare
benefits under four federal programs administered by the states:
Aid to Families with Dependent Children, Old Age Assistance, Aid
to the Blind, and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled. 29
Under SSI, the federal government displaced the states and
assumed responsibility for funding payments and setting
standards of need. The effect was to expand Medicaid eligibility in
some states to those who were not previously eligible under stateset standards. 30
Beginning in the 1980s, Congress expanded Medicaid
eligibility to certain individuals who were not receiving federal
welfare. In 1989, Congress extended eligibility to pregnant women
and children under age six, with household incomes up to 133
percent of the federal poverty line. 31 In 1990, Congress extended
eligibility to children aged six through eighteen with household
income up to 100 percent of the federal poverty line. 32
Every state accepted these changes and elected to continue to
participate in the expanded Medicaid program. However, many
low-income individuals remained ineligible. For example, adults
under age 65 who do not care for dependent children or are not
pregnant or disabled are generally ineligible, regardless of
income. 33 Parents who care for dependent children may be eligible,
but standards vary by state, with the median eligibility cap of 37
percent of the federal poverty line for unemployed parents and 63
percent of the federal poverty line for parents with earnings. 34 The
Secretary of Health and Human Services (“Secretary”) may
authorize states to engage in “demonstration projects” that deviate
from federal Medicaid requirements and expand eligibility and
provide additional funds to states to cover parents with higher
29. Id.
30. The 1972 changes gave states a second option. That option, the “209(b)
option,” allowed states to maintain their existing basic Medicaid eligibility
standards (keyed to their federal welfare eligibility standards) so long as they
adopted a “spend-down” provision that made eligible those individuals whose
incomes otherwise met the SSI standard, but were too high to meet the state’s
existing basic Medicaid eligibility standard, when an individual used his or
her income above the basic Medicaid eligibility standard for medical care.
Social Security Act of 1972 Section 209(b), Pub. L. No. 92-603 (Oct. 30, 1972).
The upshot of this provision, too, was to expand Medicaid eligibility in some
states.
31. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239,
§ 6401, 103 Stat. 2258 (1989).
32. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
§ 4601, 104 Stat. 1388-166 (1990).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396(d) (listing categories of individuals who are
eligible).
34. Performing Under Pressure: Annual Findings of a 50-State Survey of
Eligibility, Enrollment, Renewal, and Cost-Sharing Policies in Medicaid and
CHIP, 2011-2012, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED 2
fig. 4 (Jan. 2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress
.com/2013/01/8272.pdf.
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incomes. 35 However, a vast number of low-income individuals still
remain ineligible.
The Secretary enforces state compliance with the federal
Medicaid requirements. In particular, the Medicaid Act authorizes
the Secretary to withhold all “further [Medicaid] payments . . . to
the State” if he or she determines that the state is out of
compliance with any Medicaid requirement. 36 This allows, but
does not require, the Secretary to withhold all federal Medicaid
funding for a state that fails to comply with a particular
requirement. It also allows the Secretary to withhold just a portion
of the federal Medicaid funding related to a state’s compliance
failure, or to withhold nothing at all.
Congress sought to address the gaping need for medical
coverage for low-income individuals in 2010, when it enacted the
PPACA. 37 In particular, the Act required state programs to
provide Medicaid coverage to adults with incomes up to 133
percent of the federal poverty line. 38 (With the 5 percent set-aside,
this meant that participating states had to provide Medicaid
coverage to adults with incomes up to 138 percent of the federal
poverty line). 39 Like earlier changes to the Medicaid program,
states stood to lose their entire federal Medicaid funding, or the
portion of it dedicated to the Medicaid expansion, if they declined
to meet this new condition. 40 Again, this was subject to the
Secretary’s discretion. 41 But unlike earlier changes to the
Medicaid program, Medicaid expansion under the PPACA came
with a significant boon for the states: the federal government
would pay 100 percent of the expansion through 2016, 95 percent
in 2017, 94 percent in 2018, 93 percent in 2019, and 90 percent in
2020 and thereafter. 42 (Recall that the federal Medicaid
contribution before the Medicaid expansion in the PPACA
generally fell between 50 percent and 83 percent of a state’s total
Medicaid expenditures). 43 The very generous federal contribution
rate amounted to a free gift to the states, at least until 2016, and
ensured that states would consider it too good to pass up. Indeed,
35. 42 U.S.C. § 1315.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1396c.
37. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396c (authorizing the Secretary to withdraw federal
Medicaid funding for a state that fails to comply with a Medicaid
requirement).
41. Id.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d. Moreover, the federal government will pay 90% of
the state administrative expenses associated with upgrading information
systems for making eligibility determinations through 2015. 76 Fed. Reg.
21,950 (Apr. 19, 2011). The federal government ordinarily pays 50% of most
state administrative expenses. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(a)(2)-(5) and (7).
43. Fiscal Year 2010 State Expenditure Report, supra note 23, at 11, Table 5.
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that was Congress’s expectation.
Medicaid expansion was a significant part of the PPACA’s
goal of achieving universal health insurance coverage, 44 but it was
not the only part. Another key provision of the Act, the so-called
“universal coverage” provision or the “individual mandate,”
required uninsured individuals to purchase health insurance or
pay a tax penalty. 45 Yet another provision required most
employers to provide health insurance to their employees. 46
Finally, the nondiscrimination and “community rating” provisions
prohibited insurers from denying coverage for individuals with
pre-existing health conditions and kept insurance rates in check. 47
Together, these provisions of the PPACA were designed to ensure
universal, or near-universal, insurance coverage at affordable
prices. 48
The Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), projected in March
2011 that Medicaid expansion would increase Medicaid enrollment
by about 17 million individuals, while costing states very little as a
portion of their total budgets. In particular, the CBO estimated
that Medicaid expansion would increase state Medicaid spending
by roughly $60 billion between 2012 and 2021. 49 Federal spending
was projected to increase by $627 billion over the same period. 50
The Center for Budget and Policy Priorities estimated that
increased state spending would have been just 2.8 percent more
than what states would have spent on Medicaid without the
expansion. 51
But some states contested the expansion, among other aspects
of the PPACA. On the day the President signed the Act, thirteen
states filed suit. 52 They were later joined by thirteen more states,
individuals and the National Federation of Independent
Businesses. 53 The plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that
Congress lacked the power to enact the Medicaid expansion
44. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Statement of Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, before the Subcommittee
on Health, Committee on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of
Representatives, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE 26 (Mar. 30, 2011),
available at www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/121xx/doc12119/0330-healthcarelegislation.pdf. This estimate was different than the one the
CBO provided the year before—$20 billion between 2010 and 2019. Id. “The
difference between those two estimates mostly reflects the different time
periods they cover.” Id.
50. Id. at 25.
51. January Angeles, How Health Reform’s Medicaid Expansion Will
Impact State Budgets, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES 1 (July 25,
2012), available at www.cbpp.org/files/7-12-12health.pdf.
52. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580.
53. Id.
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portion of the PPACA. 54 In particular, they argued that Medicaid
expansion was “coercive” upon the states and that Congress
violated principles of federalism when it conditioned the whole of a
state’s federal Medicaid allotment on that state’s compliance with
Medicaid expansion. 55
The states fashioned their argument based on the limits on
congressional authority to set conditions on federal spending
under the Spending Clause. That Clause grants Congress the
power “to pay the Debts and provide for the . . . general Welfare of
the United States.” 56 It means that Congress can spend money for
the general welfare; it also means that Congress can set conditions
on receipt of that money. 57 Therefore, when Congress grants
money to the states, it can set conditions that “encourage a State
to regulate in a particular way [and] influenc[e] a State’s policy
choices.” 58 In this way, Congress can effect policies indirectly
(through the states), even if it might lack authority to effect them
directly (through an enumerated power in Article 1, Section 8). 59
The leading case applying these principles is South Dakota v.
Dole. 60 In Dole, South Dakota challenged a federal statute that
conditioned its receipt of a portion of federal highway funds on its
adoption of a minimum drinking age. 61 In particular, the federal
statue directed the Secretary of Transportation to withhold 5
percent of federal highway funds otherwise allocable to a state “in
which the purchase or public possession . . . of any alcoholic
beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one years of age is
lawful.” 62 South Dakota, which allowed anyone over nineteen
years of age to purchase beer containing up to 3.2 percent alcohol,
challenged the law, arguing that it exceeded congressional
authority under the Spending Clause and violated the TwentyFirst Amendment. 63
The Supreme Court rejected the challenge and upheld the law,
applying a four-part test for conditional spending under the
54. Id. at 2581-82.
55. Id.
56. U.S. CONST., Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 1.
57. See, e.g., Coll. Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999) (explaining that there are conditions
attached to federal funding).
58. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
59. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (recognizing
congressional authority “to further broad policy objectives by conditioning
receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal
statutory and administrative directives”); see generally United States v.
Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66 (1936) (holding that “the power of Congress to authorize
expenditure of public moneys for public purposes is not limited by the direct
grants of legislative power found in the Constitution.”).
60. S. Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
61. Id.
62. 23 U.S.C. § 158.
63. Dole, 483 U.S. at 205.
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Spending Clause. 64 First, the Court noted that federal highway
funds served “the general welfare.” 65 Next, the Court said that the
program conditioned the receipt of federal funds “unambiguously
. . . enable[ing] the States to exercise their choice knowingly,
cognizant of the consequences of their participation.” 66 Third, the
Court wrote that the condition (the 21-year-old drinking age) was
sufficiently related to the federal interest in the federal highway
program. 67 Finally, the Court held that the condition did not violate
an “independent constitutional bar.” 68 The Court held that the
condition did not violate the Twenty-First Amendment, because it
was an indirect regulation on the drinking age. 69 More importantly,
the Court held that the condition did not violate state sovereignty
under the Tenth Amendment (or some invisible radiation of the
Tenth Amendment), because it was not unduly coercive:
Our decisions have recognized that in some circumstances the
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to
pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’ Here,
however, Congress has directed only that a State desiring to
establish a minimum drinking age lower than 21 lose a relatively
small percentage of certain federal highway funds. Petitioner
contends that the coercive nature of this program is evident from
the degree of success it has achieved. We cannot conclude, however,
that a conditional grant of federal money of this sort is
unconstitutional simply by reason of its success in achieving the
congressional objective.
Here Congress has offered relatively mild encouragement to the
States to enact higher minimum drinking ages than they would
otherwise choose. But the enactment of such laws remains the
prerogative of the States not merely in theory but in fact. Even if
Congress might lack the power to impose a national minimum
drinking age directly, we conclude that encouragement to the state
action found in [the federal statute] is a valid use of the spending
power. 70

64. See id. at 208 (noting that South Dakota did not dispute the first three
prongs of the test).
65. Id. at 207. The Court reiterated that this is a highly deferential
standard—that “[i]n considering whether a particular expenditure is intended
to serve general public purposes, courts should defer substantially to the
judgment of Congress.” Id. (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640, 645
(1937)).
66. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
67. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (citing Massachusetts v. U. S., 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978)). The Court concluded that the condition promoted highway safety (by
reducing drinking and driving), one of the objectives of the federal highway
program. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-209.
68. Id. at 209 (quoting Lawrence Cnty. v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist. No.
40-1, 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985)).
69. Dole, 483 U.S. at 206, 208-209.
70. Id. at 211-12 (quoting Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301

2014]

The Strange Politics of Medicare Expansion

957

The Court had never (before NFIB) found a Spending Clause
condition that passed the point at which “pressure turns into
compulsion” 71 therefore violating state sovereignty under this
fourth prong of the Dole test. The Court did identify other
federalism limits on congressional authority, however. Most
notably, the Court in New York v. United States, held that
Congress cannot commandeer a state by directly requiring it to
enact or enforce federal policy. 72 The Court extended this anticommandeering principle to state officers in Printz v. United
States. 73 But the Court had never found that an indirect Spending
Clause condition violated state sovereignty by compelling a state
to comply with a federal condition.
Still, that was exactly what the states argued in challenging
Medicaid expansion under the PPACA. They claimed that
Medicaid expansion was coercive because it was so generous (who
could say no?), and because they stood to lose so much if they
declined to participate. 74 They argued that they had become
enmeshed in the federal Medicaid program over time and had
acceded to its expansions, and that this latest expansion cynically
leveraged their earlier participation by tying their entire federal
Medicaid funding to it. 75 In short, they claimed that Medicaid
expansion was an offer that they simply could not refuse. 76
The Supreme Court agreed. Chief Justice Roberts, in a
plurality opinion joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, 77 wrote
that the threat of a state losing its entire pre-existing federal
Medicaid grant was “economic dragooning that leaves the States
with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.” 78

U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
71. Davis, 301 U.S. at 590.
72. New York, 505 U.S. at 144.
73. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997).
74. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601-04.
75. Id.
76. They also claimed, remarkably, that it intruded on state sovereignty,
because the federal government would have to pay for it by taxing citizens,
thus leaving less for the states to tax. (Because citizens only have so much
money, the states claimed, the greater federal taxation squeezes out states’
ability to tax). Brief of State Petitioners on Medicaid, State of Florida, et al. v.
United States Department of Health and Human Services, et al., (No. 11-400)
at 43–48 (Jan. 10, 2012); Transcript of Oral Argument at 5–9 State of Florida,
et al. v. United States Department of Health and Human Services, et al. (No.
11-400).
77. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2656-68. Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion
on Medicaid expansion is the opinion of the Court on that issue. Id. Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito, writing together in the joint dissent,
argued that Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional in whole, and could not
be “saved” by allowing states to reject it and still retain pre-existing federal
Medicaid funds. Id. Justice Ginsburg, writing for herself and Justice
Sotomayor, argued that Medicaid expansion was constitutional as written. Id.
78. Id. at 2574.
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In this case, the financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much
more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head
. . . . A State that opts out of the Affordable Care Act’s expansion in
health care coverage thus stands to lose not merely ‘a relatively
small percentage’ of its existing Medicaid funding, but all of it.
Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average
State’s total budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of
those costs. The Federal Government estimates that it will pay out
approximately $3.3 trillion between 2010 and 2019 in order to cover
the costs of pre-expansion Medicaid. In addition, the States have
developed intricate statutory and administrative regimes over the
course of many decades to implement their objectives under existing
Medicaid. 79

Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that Medicaid
expansion was “not properly viewed as a modification of the
existing Medicaid program.” 80 Instead, it was an entirely new
program:
The Medicaid expansion, however, accomplishes a shift in kind, not
merely degree. The original program was designed to cover medical
services for four particular categories of the needy . . . . Previous
amendments to Medicaid eligibility merely altered and expanded
the boundaries of these categories. Under the Affordable Care Act,
Medicaid is transformed into a program to meet the health care
needs of the entire nonelderly population with income below 133
percent of the poverty level. It is no longer a program to care for the
neediest among us, but rather an element of a comprehensive
national plan to provide universal health coverage. 81

As a result, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that the
Secretary could not withdraw a state’s entire pre-existing federal
Medicaid grant for failure to comply with the expansion. 82 But he
also wrote that the Secretary could withhold or withdraw federal
funds available for the expansion for any state that declined to
participate. 83 In other words, the federal government could decline
to provide a state with the new funds for Medicaid expansion if
that state declined to expand its Medicaid program; but the federal
government could not take away all of a state’s federal Medicaid
funds simply because the state declined to participate in Medicaid
expansion.
As a result, some states did decline to expand Medicaid. 84 But
79. Id. at 2604 (citations omitted).
80. Id. at 2605.
81. Id. at 2605-06.
82. Id. at 2607.
83. Id.
84. See Status of State Action on the Medicaid Expansion Decision, 2014,
THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, available at http://kff.org/healthreform/state-indicator/state-activity-around-expanding-medicaid-under-theaffordable-care-act/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2014) (tracking the states’ positions
on Medicaid expansion); Interactive: A State-by-State Look at How the
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they did so at tremendous cost to themselves and to their citizens.
The next section explores the implications of the refusal of these
states to expand Medicaid, and of the Supreme Court’s ruling in
NFIB.

III. THE STRANGE POLITICS OF MEDICAID EXPANSION
This section explores the costs of states’ opposition to
Medicaid expansion, both in the NFIB case itself and in refusing to
expand Medicaid in the wake of NFIB. In particular, this section
examines the significant federal resources that opposing states
will leave on the table, the significant number of poor citizens that
they will leave uninsured, and the damage they have done to
constitutional law through their opposition in NFIB. The section
illustrates the singular costs that opponents of Medicaid expansion
are willing to incur in order to score a very modest political point.
First, a note about sources. Several organizations have done
outstanding work analyzing the likely effects of Medicaid
expansion, both before the PPACA passed and after. These
include, among others: The Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, 85
The Urban Institute, 86 and the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities. 87 The CBO has also issued several reports on Medicaid
expansion. 88 The analysis below draws on some, but by no means
all, of this work. For more, see the web pages cited in the
immediately preceding footnotes.
Moreover, the analysis principally draws on sources and data
available before Congress passed the PPACA and before the Court
ruled in NFIB. That is because state officials complained about
expanding Medicaid before Congress passed the PPACA and
before the Court ruled in NFIB. In fact, that was the whole point
of the states’ suit challenging Medicaid expansion in NFIB. They
balked, presumably, knowing the implications and impacts
detailed in these sources, leading to strange politics even before
the Court ruled in NFIB. That being said, this analysis also relies
on some sources and data available after the Court ruled in NFIB,
because state officials made decisions and declarations about their
intentions to expand Medicaid after the Court ruled in NFIB. They
Uninsured Fare Under the ACA, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION,
available at http://kff.org/interactive/uninsured-gap/ (last visited Apr. 18,
2014).
85. Medicaid: The Affordable Care Act and Recent Section 1115 Medicaid
Demonstration Waivers, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, available
at http://kff.org/medicaid/ (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
86. Medicaid, THE URBAN INSTITUTE, available at www.urban.org/health
/medicaid.cfm (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
87. Medicaid, THE CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, available
at www.cbpp.org/research/?fa=topic&id=72 (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
88. Medicaid and CHIP, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, available at
www.cbo.gov/topics/health-care/medicaid-and-chip (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
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also made these decisions, presumably, with the knowledge of the
implications and impacts detailed in these sources, leading to
strange politics after the Court ruled in NFIB.

A. Medicaid Expansion Is a Boon to States
The federal government will bear, on average, nearly 93
percent of the costs of Medicaid expansion over its first nine
years. 89 The federal government will pay 100 percent of the
expansion through 2016, 95 percent in 2017, 94 percent in 2018,
93 percent in 2019, and 90 percent in 2020 and permanently
thereafter. 90 As compared to the pre-existing federal contribution
to states’ Medicaid programs—generally between 50 percent and
83 percent of a state’s total Medicaid expenditures 91—this is an
exceptionally generous gift to the states from the federal
government. 92
Moreover, Medicaid expansion adds little to what states
would have spent on their Medicaid programs over this same
period without the expansion. 93 The CBO estimated that Medicaid
expansion will cost states just 2.8 percent more than the amount
they would have spent on Medicaid from 2014 to 2022 in the
absence of health reform. 94 The Urban Institute estimated that
Medicaid expansion would cost states just 1.4 percent more than
the amount they would have spent from 2014 to 2019 without
expansion, and 2.9 percent if participation turns out to be higher
than expected. 95 The Lewin Group estimated that total state
89. Angeles, supra note 51, at 1.
90. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(y). Moreover, the federal government will pay 90%
of the state administrative expenses associated with upgrading information
systems for making eligibility determinations through 2015. Medicaid
Program, 76 Fed. Reg. 21,950 (Apr. 19, 2011). The federal government
ordinarily pays 50% of most state administrative expenses. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396b(a)(2)-(5), (7).
91. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
92. Edwin Park and Matt Broaddus, Correcting Seven Myths About
Medicaid, CENTER FOR BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES 3 (updated Apr. 10,
2014), available at www.cbpp.org/files/9-24-13health.pdf.
93. For a recent study that surveys 32 prior studies on the impact of
Medicaid expansion on states’ economies, see The Role of Medicaid in State
Economies and the ACA THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE
UNINSURED, (Nov. 2013), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files
.wordpress.com/2013/11/8522-the-role-of-medicaid-in-state-economies-lookingforward-to-the-aca.pdf (providing a recent study that surveys thirty-two prior
studies on the impact of Medicaid expansion on states’ economies).
94. Angeles, supra note 51, at 1, 4, 8-9.
95. John Holahan and Irene Headen, Medicaid Coverage and Spending in
Health Reform: National and State-by-State Results for Adults at or Below
133% FPL, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED (May
2010), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/01
/medicaid-coverage-and-spending-in-health-reform-national-and-state-by-stateresults-for-adults-at-or-below-133-fpl.pdf.
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Medicaid spending under the expansion would increase by $17.4
billion, or, on average, 1.1 percent. 96
Additionally, Medicaid expansion stands to reduce states’
costs for uncompensated care and other health-care services they
provide for low-income individuals. These costs are significant. For
example, in 2008 state and local governments incurred $8.6 billion
in care for hospital care for the uninsured. 97 State and local
governments also incur substantial costs in care for the uninsured
through state mental health agencies. 98 Under Medicaid
expansion, states could cut costs of uncompensated care and
related state- and local-funded programs. 99
For a number of states the reduction of costs under Medicaid
expansion could offset all or most of the costs of Medicaid
expansion. 100 Results from Massachusetts, the only state to
experiment with this kind of program, support this.
Massachusetts’s legislation, which was enacted in 2006, was the
model for the PPACA. 101 The program included expanded
Medicaid coverage, a requirement that most large employers
provide health insurance, a requirement for individuals to
purchase health insurance, and subsidies to help low- and
moderate-income residents to purchase insurance. 102 As a result,
the percentage of uninsured in Massachusetts dropped from 5.7
percent in 2007, 103 the year of implementation, to 1.9 percent in

96. John Sheils, Kathy Kuhmerker, et al., The Impact of the Medicaid
Expansions and Other Provisions of Health Reform on State Medicaid
Spending,
THE
LEWIN
GROUP
(Dec.
9,
2010),
available
at
www.lewin.com/~/media/Lewin/Site_Sections/Publications/Lewin_Impact_of_
Medicaid_Expansions_on_State_Spending.pdf.
97. Jack Hadley, John Holahan, et al., Covering the Uninsured in 2008:
Current Costs, Sources of Payment, and Incremental Costs, 27 HEALTH
AFFAIRS 399, 406 (Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://content.healthaffairs
.org/content/27/5/w399.full.pdf.
98. Fiscal Year 2009 State Mental Health Revenue and Expenditure Study
Results, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM
DIRECTORS RESEARCH INSTITUTE, INC. (Sept. 2011), available at www.nriinc.org/projects/Profiles/RevExp2009/RESummary2009.pdf.
99. See Quick Take: Key Considerations in Evaluating the ACA Medicaid
Expansion for States, KAISER COMMISSION ON MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED
(Apr. 18, 2013), available at http://kff.org/medicaid/fact-sheet/keyconsiderations-in-evaluating-the-aca-medicaid-expansion-for-states-2/(finding
that “[s]tates are also likely to see savings or offsets to costs from the Medicaid
coverage expansion from: reduced state spending for uncompensated care
. . . or reduced spending for programs that service indigent populations (such
as state funded mental health or substance abuse programs.”).
100. Angeles, supra note 51, at 5.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Massachusetts Household Survey on Health Insurance Status, 2007,
MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND POLICY 3, available
at www.mass.gov/chia/docs/r/pubs/10/mhis-report-12-2010.pdf (last visited
Apr. 18, 2014).
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2010. 104 After Massachusetts enacted the program, state spending
on uncompensated care decreased significantly. Indeed, in 2008,
the first year after implementation, state spending on
uncompensated care dropped substantially under the prior year’s
payments. 105
Finally, Medicaid expansion will likely boost states’
economies in other ways. For example, Medicaid expansion is
projected to increase state economic output, gross state product,
and state and local revenues, and, in general, “have a noticeable
and sustained increase in state economic activity.” 106 Medicaid
expansion is also projected to increase employment and even
salaries and earnings. 107
Opponents argue that Medicaid expansion will cost states
money. Opponents allege that states will incur significant new
expenses for covering individuals who already qualify under preexisting rules, and that the federal government will pay only its
pre-existing rate for those individuals, and not the higher rate for
newly eligible individuals.
But estimates of state costs already account for newly
enrolled individuals who already qualify under pre-existing rules.
That is, the federal share of Medicaid expansion averages 93
percent between 2014 and 2022, and states face an increase of only
2.8 percent, on average, even accounting for the enrollment of
already-qualified individuals. Moreover, other provisions of the
PPACA, like the universal coverage requirement and procedures
to simplify Medicaid enrollment, will increase Medicaid enrollment
by individuals who qualify already. 108 That means that some of the
costs states will incur are associated with increased enrollment by
already-qualified individuals and cannot be attributed to Medicaid
expansion. 109
Finally, studies supporting vastly increased state costs
dramatically overstate those costs. As summarized by the Center
for Budget and Policy Priorities, those studies suffer from flawed
assumptions and other errors. 110 For example, those studies make
assumptions about participation rates that are not supported by
104. Massachusetts Household Survey on Health Insurance Status:
Results from the 2008–2010 Surveys, MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION OF HEALTH
CARE FINANCE AND POLICY 9 (Dec. 2010), available at www.mass.gov
/chia/docs/r/pubs/10/mhis-report-12-2010.pdf.
105. 2009 Annual Report: Health Safety Net, MASSACHUSETTS DIVISION
OF HEALTH CARE FINANCE AND POLICY 5 (Dec. 2009), available at
www.mass.gov/chia/provider/health-safety-net/health-safety-net-reports.html.
106. The Role of Medicaid in State Economies, supra note 93, at 4
107. Id.
108. Angeles, supra note 51, at 2.
109. Id.
110. See id. at 7-8 (summarizing overstatements and mistaken
assumptions in studies and by policy-makers in Mississippi, Nebraska,
Indiana, and Florida).
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experience with participation rates in various means-tested
programs. 111 Some of those studies assume that under Medicaid
expansion 100 percent of eligible individuals with sign up for
Medicaid. 112 But other means-tested programs have much lower
participation rates, between 43 percent and 86 percent. 113 Even
Medicare achieves only a 96 percent participation rate. 114 “While a
mandate to have health insurance, requirements to establish a
simplified and seamless enrollment process, and the publicity and
outreach efforts surrounding the expansion should result in
increased enrollment, the evidence is overwhelming that the
participation rate will not be 100 percent.” 115
Those studies also make an unsupported assumption that
already-insured individuals who qualify for Medicaid under
Medicaid expansion will drop their current coverage and enroll in
Medicaid instead. 116 In other words, some of these studies assume
that Medicaid expansion will “crowd out” private health
insurance. 117 Some of these studies assume that 35 percent to 45
percent of new Medicaid enrollees would be individuals who
dropped their private insurance in order to enroll in Medicaid. 118
But studies of state expansions of Medicaid for children show that
only between 10 percent and 20 percent of new Medicaid enrollees
previously had private health insurance. 119
111. Id. at 7.
112. Id. (citing Dahlia Remler and Sherry Glied, What Other Programs
Can Teach Us: Increasing Participation in Health Insurance Programs, 93 AM.
J, PUBLIC HEALTH 67-74 (Jan. 2003)).
113. Angeles, supra note 51, at 7 (citing Remler and Glied, supra note
106).
114. Angeles, supra note 51, at 7 (citing Remler and Glied, supra note
106).
115. Angeles, supra note 51, at 7 (citing Sherry Gleid, Jacob Hartz, &
Genessa Giorgi, Consider it Done? The Likely Efficacy of Mandates for Health
Insurance, 26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 1612-1621 (Nov/Dec 2007), available at
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/6/1612.full.pdf+html).
116. Angeles, supra note 51, at 7; Park and Broaddus, supra note 92, at 4.
117. Angeles, supra note 51, at 8; Park and Broaddus, supra note 92, at 4.
118. Angeles, supra note 51, at 7(citing January Angeles, Some Recent
Reports Overstate the Effects on State Budgets of the Medicaid Expansion in
the Health Reform Law, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (Oct. 21,
2010), available at www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3310).
119. Angeles, supra note 51, at 7 (citing Matthew Broaddus and January
Angeles, Medicaid Expansion in Health Reform Not Likely to “Crowd Out”
Private Insurance, CENTER ON BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES (June 22,
2010) available at www.cbpp.org/files/6-22-10health.pdf); Gesture Davidson,
Lynn Blewett, and Kathleen Call, Public program crowd-out of private
coverage: What are the issues?, THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUNDATION
(June 2004), available at www.shadac.org/files/Crowdout_Brief_Jun04.pdf;
Lisa Dubay, Expansions in Public Insurance and Crowd Out: What the
Evidence Says, THE KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION (Oct. 2009), available at
http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/04/7763.pdf;
Anne
Sommers, Steve Zuckerman, Lisa Dubay, and Genevieve Kenney, Substitution
of SCHIP For Private Coverage: Results from a 2002 Evaluation in Ten States,
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Finally, these studies overstate the costs of newly enrolled
individuals under Medicaid expansion. 120 That is in part because
they make cost assumptions based on already-enrolled individuals.
Since uninsured people eligible for coverage typically seek
insurance when they become ill or develop medical conditions,
experts overwhelmingly agree that the average cost per
beneficiary of already-eligible people who have not signed up for
Medicaid will be lower, not dramatically higher, than the average
cost of those the program already serves. 121
Some have argued that the PPACA and Medicaid expansion
will result in a redistribution of wealth. But those claims are also
wrong or overstated. For example, an Urban Institute analysis of
Medicaid expansion concluded that most funding for the PPACA
(74.3 percent) comes from “recycling dollars within the health care
industry.” 122 These “recycled dollars” are reimbursement cuts and
taxes and fees on health care providers and health insurers—the
health-care industry itself. 123 These increased costs could partially
be offset by the industry’s increased revenue derived from
increased insurance coverage and Medicaid expansion under the
PPACA. 124 Other funding for the PPACA comes from tax
increases,
but
those
increases
are
not
significantly
redistributive, 125 and the PPACA will not reduce benefits for
Medicare enrollees. 126
In short, the evidence is overwhelming: Medicaid expansion
will be a boon to the states; and fears of dramatic cost increases
are unsupported. Based on the projected fiscal impacts of Medicaid
expansion, states should agree to participate. By declining to
expand Medicaid, states will forego substantial economic gains.
But more: they will deny health insurance to their low-income
citizens.

B. States Stand to Deny Insurance to Low-Income
Citizens
Medicaid expansion, if adopted by every state, would cover
about 17 million low-income adults and children, most of whom
were previously uninsured. 127 This includes about 3.5 million
26 HEALTH AFFAIRS 529 (March/April 2007)).
120. Angeles, supra note 51, at 7.
121. Id.
122. Stan Dorn, Bowen Garrett, and John Holahan, Redistribution Under
the ACA Is Modest in Scope, URBAN INSTITUTE 4-6 (Feb. 2014), available at
www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/413023-Redistribution-Under-the-ACA-is-Modestin-Scope.pdf.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id. at 4-5.
126. Id. at 6-7.
127. Statement of Douglas W. Elmendorf, supra note 49, at 3. The Urban

2014]

The Strange Politics of Medicare Expansion

965

individuals with incomes between 100 percent of the federal
poverty line and 133 percent of the federal poverty line (or 138
percent, with the 5 percent income disregard). 128 It also includes
about 11.5 million individuals with incomes below the federal
poverty line who do not qualify for pre-existing Medicaid in their
states. 129 That is because most states set Medicaid eligibility for
adults below the federal poverty line. According to the Urban
Institute, “only 18 states provide comprehensive Medicaid
coverage to parents at or above 100 percent of [the federal poverty
line].” 130 Indeed, under pre-existing state eligibility standards, a
working-poor parent, on average, loses Medicaid eligibility when
his or her income reaches just 63 percent of the federal poverty
line. 131 On average, an unemployed parent loses eligibility when
his or her income reaches just 37 percent of the federal poverty
line. 132 Under pre-existing rules, most states do not provide
Medicaid coverage at all to adults without children, no matter how
low their income falls. 133
In states that decline to expand Medicaid, low-income
individuals will go without subsidized health insurance. The
PPACA provides subsidies for individuals to purchase health
insurance through a new health insurance exchange, but only if
their incomes fall between 100 percent and 400 percent of the
federal poverty line. 134 In states where pre-existing Medicaid
eligibility is set below 100 percent of the federal poverty line, that
means that individuals with incomes too high to qualify for
Medicaid, but still below the federal poverty line, will not qualify
for Medicaid and will not qualify for a federal subsidy. Nationwide,
there are 11.5 million uninsured people with incomes below the
federal poverty line that would be eligible under Medicaid
expansion. 135
Make no mistake about it: these individuals are poor. 133
Institute puts this number at 15.1 million. Genevieve M. Kenney, Stephen
Zuckerman, et al., Opting in to the Medicaid Expansion under the ACA: Who
Are the Uninsured Adults Who Could Gain Health Insurance Coverage?,
URBAN INSTITUTE 1 (Aug. 2012), available at www.urban.org/UploadedPDF
/412630-opting-in-medicaid.pdf.
128. Id. at 2.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1.
131. Id.; Angeles, supra note 51, at 2.
132. Id. at 3.
133. Id. at 2. In contrast, on average, under pre-existing rules, children
qualify for Medicaid if their household income falls below 241 percent of the
federal poverty line. Children, MEDICAID.GOV, available at www.medicaid.gov
/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-Information/By-Population/Children/Children.html
(last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
134. Focus on Health Reform, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION
1 (July 2012), available at http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com
/2013/01/7962-02.pdf.
135. Kenney, Zuckerman, et al., supra note 127, at 1.
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percent of the federal poverty line for a single individual is
$15,520.10 and for a family of four is $31,720.50. 136 Despite Chief
Justice Roberts’s statement in NFIB that Medicaid expansion
reaches individuals who are not poor, these individuals are poor.
And most of them do not have access to private health insurance. 137
Medicaid is a dramatic improvement for the uninsured poor.
Medicaid produces good health-care results for the poor at lower
costs and with lower cost distribution as compared to no
insurance. 138 The reason is simple: individuals with Medicaid use
Medicaid-provided primary care services to head off serious health
conditions that, for uninsured individuals, end up costing more
money than they cannot afford and thus spread the cost
throughout the health-care system. For example, a study by the
Kaiser Foundation found that in general, Medicaid provides
beneficiaries services that are comparable to those in employerprovided health insurance plans, but at significantly lower
costs. 139 A study of Oregon’s Medicaid program showed that
individuals with Medicaid were 40 percent less likely to suffer a
decline in their health in the previous six months than individuals
without coverage. 140 They were also more likely to use preventive
care, visit a primary care provider regularly, and receive diagnoses
of and treatment for depression and diabetes. 141 Additionally, they
were 40 percent less likely than those without insurance to go into

136. 2014 Poverty Guidelines: All States (Except Alaska and Hawaii) and
D.C., MEDICAID.GOV, available at www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-ProgramInformation/By-Topics/Eligibility/Downloads/2014-Federal-Poverty-levelcharts.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
137. Park and Broaddus, supra note 92, at 4.
138. Medicaid may produce particularly good health results for those with
chronic conditions. See generally Lisa Clemans-Cope, Sharon K. Long, et al.,
The Expansion of Medicaid Coverage under the ACA: Implications for Health
Care Access, Use, and Spending for Vulnerable Low-income Adults, 50
INQUIRY: THE JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATION, PROVISION, AND
FINANCING, 135, 146 (May 2013), available at http://inq.sagepub.com
/content/50/2/135.full.pdf+html (“extending Medicaid coverage to low-income
uninsured adults with chronic conditions under the ACA offers the potential
for significant gains in health care access and increases in health care use, as
well as improved protection from high heath care costs.”). This comes with a
significant cost, but “[i]t is expected that these increases in spending would be
offset at least in part by reductions in uncompensated care and charity care.”
Id. at abstract.
139. Teresa A. Coughlin, Sharon K. Long, et al., What Difference Does
Medicaid Make? Assessing Cost Effectiveness, Access, and Financial Protection
under Medicaid for Low-Income Adults, THE KAISER COMMISSION ON
MEDICAID AND THE UNINSURED 1 (May 2013), available at http://kaiserfamily
foundation.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/8440-what-difference-does-medicaidmake2.pdf.
140. Katherine Baicker, Sarah Taubman, et al., The Oregon Experiment—
Effects of Medicaid on Clinical Outcomes, 368 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1713-22 (May
2, 2013).
141. Id.
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medical debt. 142 Another study found that expansion of Medicaid
coverage in Arizona, Maine, and New York reduced mortality by
6.1 percent. 143
Medicaid expansion will allow states to cover an additional 17
million mostly uninsured poor individuals, including about 11.5
million who are too poor for pre-existing Medicaid but too rich for a
federal subsidy to purchase private health insurance on an
exchange. Moreover, Medicaid expansion will likely lead to much
better health outcomes for these individuals and less personal
medical debt. By declining Medicaid expansion, states also decline
these substantial benefits to their poor citizens.

C. Objecting States Left Us With Bad
Constitutional Law
In addition to the bad policy results when states decline
Medicaid expansion, the states’ legal challenge to Medicaid
expansion in NFIB left us with bad constitutional law. The new
doctrine limits congressional authority to condition the receipt of
federal funds and potentially threatens existing programs. It also
bolsters “states’ rights” and federalism claims against federal
authority.
In particular, the Court’s ruling, forced by the states’
arguments, marks a new limit on Congress’s power to condition
the receipt of federal funds under the Spending Clause. The Court
drew this new limit at the point where conditions on “new” federal
programs (here, Medicaid expansion) threaten the receipt of
federal funds under existing programs (the pre-existing Medicaid
program). The lynchpin of the Court’s analysis is the distinction
between Medicaid expansion and pre-existing Medicaid. According
to the Court, they are two entirely different programs. The Court
explained:
The Medicaid expansion, however, accomplishes a shift in kind, not
merely degree. The original program was designed to cover medical
services for four particular categories of the needy: the disabled, the
blind, the elderly, and needy families with dependent children.
Previous amendments to Medicaid eligibility merely altered and
expanded the boundaries of these categories. Under the Affordable
Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program to meet the
health care needs of the entire nonelderly population with income
below 133 percent of the poverty level. It is no longer a program to
care for the neediest among us, but rather an element of a
comprehensive national plan to provide universal health insurance

142. Id.
143. Banjamin Sommers, Katherine Baicket, and Arnold Epstein,
Mortality and Access to Care among Adults after State Medicaid Expansions,
367 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1025-34 (Sep. 13, 2012).
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coverage. 144

Having drawn such a sharp distinction between Medicaid
expansion and pre-existing Medicaid, the Court could easily rule
that conditions on Medicaid expansion could not threaten states’
pre-existing Medicaid funding. After all, it has long been settled
that federal funding conditions must relate to the purpose of the
underlying funding program. 145 If conditions on one program
threaten funding under a separate and distinct program, the
conditions must violate this long-settled principle. The Court put it
this way:
We have upheld Congress’s authority to condition the receipt of
funds on the States’ complying with restrictions on the use of those
funds, because that is the means by which Congress ensures that
the funds are spent according to its view of the “general Welfare.”
Conditions that do not here govern the use of the funds, however,
cannot be justified on that basis. When, for example, such conditions
take the form of threats to terminate other significant independent
grants, the conditions are properly viewed as a means of pressuring
the States to accept policy changes. 146

So for the Court, program distinction was one flaw of
Medicaid expansion. But there was another. The Court held that
Medicaid expansion, by threatening the whole of states’ preexisting federal Medicaid funding, was unduly coercive. 147 In other
words, by threatening to take away a state’s entire pre-existing
federal Medicaid budget, the PPACA forced the states to accept
Medicaid expansion. The Court explained it this way:
In this case, the financial ‘inducement’ Congress has chosen is much
more than ‘relatively mild encouragement’—it is a gun to the head
. . . Medicaid spending accounts for over 20 percent of the average
State’s total budget, with federal funds covering 50 to 83 percent of
those costs. The Federal Government estimates that it will pay out
approximately $3.3 trillion between 2010 and 2019 in order to cover
the costs of pre-expansion Medicaid. In addition, the States have
developed intricate statutory and administrative regimes over the
course of many decades to implement their objectives under existing
Medicaid. It is easy to see how the Dole Court could conclude that
the threatened loss of less than half of one percent of South Dakota’s
budget left the State with a ‘prerogative’ to reject Congress’s desired
policy, ‘not merely in theory but in fact.’ The threatened loss of over
10 percent of a State’s overall budget, in contrast, is economic
dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to
acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion. 148

The upshot is that Congress is now limited in conditioning
144. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605-06.
145. Dole, 483 U.S. 208-09.
146. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2603-04.
147. Id. at 2606-07.
148. Id. at 2604-05 (citations omitted).
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federal spending to the states in two complementary ways. First,
under NFIB, Congress cannot make an alteration to an alreadyexisting federal program that is conditioned upon the federal
funding under the original program, unless the two programs are
closely related. Second, Congress cannot place a new condition on
an already-existing federal program when the condition is
sufficiently generous and the original program is sufficiently large.
But there are significant problems with this new doctrine. To
start, the Court does not tell us exactly how closely related a preexisting program and an alteration to that program must be.
Medicaid expansion—that is, enrolling individuals up to 138
percent of the federal poverty line—looks like an expansion of the
base Medicaid program. After all, pre-existing Medicaid was
designed principally to provide health-care coverage for the poor.
Medicaid expansion was designed to do this, too. (Individuals up to
138 percent of the federal poverty line are, indeed, quite poor.) 149
Indeed, pre-existing Medicaid in some states already covers
individuals at or above the federal poverty line. Yet the Court says
that Medicaid expansion “accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely
degree.” 150 If Medicaid expansion creates a shift “in kind, not
merely degree,” it is not at all clear where that shift occurs in
other programs.
Some think that the Court’s ruling could threaten other wellestablished conditioned-spending programs and tie the hands of
Congress in imposing new conditions on pre-existing programs,
especially in the area of civil rights. Some are particularly worried
about Title IX. 151 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972
provides that entities that receive federal funding may not
discriminate on the basis of sex in education programs and
activities. 152 Title IX reaches all operations of an entity receiving
federal education funds, including not only the traditional
educational programs but also housing, transportation, campus
commercial operations (like restaurants and bookstores), and
athletics. It “has had a revolutionary effect in opening educational

149. 2014 Poverty Guidelines, supra note 136.
150. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605.
151. Kevin Russell, Civil rights statutes put at risk by health care decision,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jun. 29, 2012), available at www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/civilrights-statutes-put-at-risk-by-health-care-decision/; Carrie Johnson, How the
Health Care Ruling Might Affect Civil Rights, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (July
6, 2012), available at www.npr.org/2012/07/06/156378347/how-the-health-careruling-might-affect-civil-rights.
152. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 235 (1972), codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1681–88. See Title IX and Sex Discrimination, ED.GOV., available at
www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2014)
(providing general information on Title IX); see also Title IX Info, available at
www.titleix.info (last visited Apr. 18, 2014) (providing more background
information on Title IX).
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opportunities to women and girls over the past forty years.” 153
Title IX, like Medicaid expansion, was a new condition on
substantial and generous pre-existing federal funding programs
for education. The opposing states’ position, and ultimately the
Court’s ruling in NFIB, could work to dismantle Title IX. Justice
Ginsburg articulated the concern best in a comment and question
at oral argument in NFIB:
Most colleges and universities are heavily dependent on the
government to fund their research programs and other things, and
that has been going on for a long time. And then Title IX passes, and
a government official comes around and says to the colleges, you
want money for your physics labs and all the other things you get it
for, then you have to create an athletic program for girls. And the
recipient says, I am being coerced, there is no way in the world I can
give up all the funds to run all these labs that we have, I can’t give
it up, so I’m being coerced to accept this program that I don’t want . . .
[I]f your theory is any good, why doesn’t it work any time
. . . someone receives something that is too good to give up? 154

The same concern could apply to Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, which prohibits race discrimination “under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance,” 155
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which prohibits
disability discrimination “under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance,” 156 or other measures that impose
conditions across pre-existing federal spending programs. While
there are good arguments why the Court’s ruling in NFIB should
not threaten these programs, 157 the Court’s ruling understandably
causes some concern.
Moreover, everyone seems to agree that Congress could have
achieved its desired aim by entirely dismantling the pre-existing
Medicaid program one day and re-enacting it with Medicaid
expansion the next. It is not at all clear why Medicaid expansion
represents a new program in the PPACA (and is therefore
unconstitutional as it was written), but would not substantially
deviate from the rest of a new Medicaid program if Congress
simply enacted it together with a re-enacted pre-existing Medicaid
program. In any event, this potential congressional work-around
153. Emily J. Martin, Title IX and the New Spending Clause, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION SOCIETY, ISSUE BRIEF 5 (Dec. 2012), available at www.acslaw
.org/sites/default/files/Martin_-_Title_IX_and_the_New_Spending_Clause_1.pdf.
154. Transcript of Oral Argument at 21: 18, National Federation of
Independent
Business
v.
Sebelius
(No.
11-393),
available
at
www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_audio.aspx.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
156. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).
157. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-Leveraging Principle and the
Spending Clause After NFIB, 101 GEO. L. J. 861 (2013); Martin, supra note
153, at 5.
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highlights the absurdity of the Court’s new test. After all, if the
rock-solid principles of federalism at the core of the Court’s ruling
mean anything, how could Congress so easily bypass them with a
simple shell game?
Next, the Court does not tell us exactly how significant a preexisting program must be before a new condition turns pressure
into compulsion. The Court does tell us that the pre-existing
Medicaid program plays significant roles in state budgets and
administration (and a substantially greater role than the federal
highway funds at stake in Dole), and that these significant roles
make Medicaid expansion look like “a gun to the head” of the
states. But it does not tell us when a pre-existing federal program
crosses that line. And the grey area is large: states stood only to
lose 5 percent of their federal highway funds if they declined the
condition upheld in Dole; but they stand to lose “over 10 percent of
a State’s overall budget” if they decline Medicaid expansion. The
ruling potentially puts many other federal programs at risk.
The opponents’ arguments and the Court’s ruling on this
point are particularly surprising, given that a number of states
announced that they would decline to participate in Medicaid
expansion even before the Court ruled in NFIB. One might have
thought that if Medicaid expansion operated like a “gun to the
head” of the states, all states would have had to participate.
The ruling also bolsters “states’ rights” and federalism claims
against federal authority in the area of federal conditioned
spending. It does this by underscoring and expanding federalism
principles that animate the Court’s jurisprudence on conditioned
spending. In particular, the Court wrote that our system of
federalism and dual sovereignty, where “States [stand] as
independent sovereigns in our federal system,” is designed to
enhance freedom and promote individual liberty. 158 The Court said
that Congress would destroy that balance if it could require states
to act in accordance with federal policies. 159 The Court also stated
that its doctrine promotes transparency and accountability in
governance. It said that when the federal government forces the
states to act, the voters cannot tell who to hold to account—their
state elected representatives, or their federal elected
representatives. 160
But these reasons are inapt in the context of Medicaid
expansion. For one, it is not at all clear how freedom and
individual liberty are threatened under Medicaid expansion in the
PPACA, or how freedom and individual liberty are enhanced by
the Court’s ruling in NFIB. Indeed, if freedom and liberty are at
stake at all in Medicaid expansion, it is probably the freedom and
158. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2602.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 2602-03.
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liberty of newly eligible Medicaid beneficiaries to receive medical
care. If so, and if the Court were concerned with that freedom and
liberty, the Court should have upheld Medicaid expansion as
written in the PPACA. As to transparency and accountability,
these have little relevance in Medicaid expansion. Voters know
who to hold to account in a cooperative federalism program like
Medicaid, and given all the attention on the PPACA, they know
who to hold to account here.

IV. CONCLUSION
States opposing Medicaid expansion do so at an enormous
cost. They stand to leave millions of their poor citizens uninsured,
they leave substantial federal grants on the table (along with the
economic benefits that those grants would bring to them), and they
wreak havoc on long-settled constitutional doctrine.
Given these enormous costs, we might expect that opposing
states have a good reason to oppose Medicaid expansion. Not so.
While they claim that Medicaid expansion would cost them too
much money, the studies, both before PPACA enactment and after
NFIB, belie this. And while opposing Medicaid expansion might be
a part of a larger effort to undermine or dismantle the PPACA
entirely, a states’ rejection of Medicaid expansion comes with
enormous opportunity costs in the meantime.
It is no surprise that raw politics can drive bad policy,
especially in today’s divisive political climate. But states that
oppose and decline Medicaid expansion take these raw politics to a
whole new level. They essentially shoot themselves, and their poor
citizens, in the foot in order to score a modest political point. Time
will tell whether this gambit pays off for those states or their
decision-makers. (It surely will not pay off for these states’ poor
citizens, many of whom are left too rich for their state’s preexisting Medicaid program but too poor for a federal subsidy to
purchase insurance, now required under the PPACA’s individual
mandate). In the meantime: this sure seems like strange politics.

